Why Humans Aren’t the Only Ones Deserving of Moral Consideration

The main focus of this paper is to answer the question, Do nonhuman animals (NHA) have a right to moral consideration? Technically, I am not asking the question, “Do NHA deserve equal moral treatment from humans”.According to Peter Singer, professor of philosophy at Princeton University, “the basic principle of equality does not require equal or identical treatment; it requires equal consideration” (Olen, Van Camp, Barry, 465). We cannot expect equal moral treatment of NHA since we cannot even expect the equal more treatment of humans. For example, we aren’t always capable of all moral actions. A man is not treated the same as a women in the case of abortion. Since a man is incapable of becoming impregnated, it seems foolish to treat him as if he could. The same goes for a dog voting. Since a dog does not possess the ability to rationalize or understand the notion of voting, it seems foolish to treat him as if he could. Hence, the focus of this paper is to discover whether or not animals have a right to moral consideration.

The concept of moral consideration is that the individual in question deserves some type of moral consideration which ultimately protects their well-being. It is clear that humans have moral consideration for one another. Why is it that humans do not have moral consideration for NHA? What gives humans more moral worth and elevates them to the point where NHA receive no moral consideration? The task at hand it to find a solid quality or trait that humans and NHA have in common which will bring moral consideration to NHA. By observing and analyzing the following case study, perhaps we will be able to clearly identify what quality or trait needs to be possessed in order to obtain our moral consideration.

“The Rochester experimenters anesthetized the dog before pressure of 2,000 pounds per square inch was applied to the dog’s leg (A press called the Blalock press was used on dogs to see what happens when a dog goes into a state of shock due to intense trauma). Each dog in the experiment remained in the press for several hours and “in no case” was any anesthetic given after the last hour of the press. After being released from the press, the experimenters began to observe the dogs’ actions. The dogs usually died, in extreme pain, in from five to twelve hours after being taken out of the press. Over four thousand dogs were killed throughout the experiments” (Morse, 12-13).

The above case study “shocks the conscience” to say the least. Why is that though? Singer argues that the quality or trait that all humans and NHA possess is having interests. These interests concern the promotion of the individual’s well-being. These interests can be known consciously or unknown unconsciously. For example, I am consciously interested in the consumption of food for energy since it promotes my well-being. A dolphin’s unconscious interest is to be submerged in proper amounts of water since it promotes the dolphin’s well-being. Not being abused is a dog’s unconscious interest since it promotes the dog’s well-being. Singer argues using a utilitarian model in the sense that he wishes to promote the greatest amount of good. By promoting these interests, a large quantity of good is being produced.

In order to have interests an individual must be able to register differences concerning its own welfare. For example, a stone being kicked along the road does not possess interests since it cannot distinguish changes in its welfare. In other words, the stone does not have interests because it cannot feel pain, suffer, feel pleasure, or enjoy. The ability to suffer and feel enjoyment is “a prerequisite for having interests at all” (Olen, Van Camp, Barry, 468). I have interests in consuming food because I have the capacity to suffer (feel famished) and to feel pleasure (when I eat and feel energized). A dolphin has interests in being in water since it has the capacity to suffer (die from exposure when outside of water) and to feel pleasure (being in the water). A dog has interests in not being abused since it has the capacity to suffer (feel pain) and to feel pleasure (the pleasure of not being abused). This quality or trait is what we humans and NHA have in common. We both can suffer and feel pain which in turn allows us to have interests promoting our well-being. Another supporter of such a view is Tom Regan, professor of philosophy at North Carolina State University. Regan, using Kant’s respect for persons model, argues that NHA deserve the same respect as humans. He believes that humans and NHA possess an inherent worth which describes them as being valuable independent of their use. Regan would agree with Singer in the sense that NHA and humans have these interests or an inherent worth which makes them worthy of moral consideration. By returning to the above case study concerning the dogs used in the experiments, we can now make sense of the “conscious shocker” we received. The notion of a human or NHA suffering and feeling pain is morally wrong. “The question is not, Can they reason, nor Can they talk, but, Can they suffer?” (Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation).

In the animal rights movement, the basic premise of the argument promoting animal rights was the ideal that all sentient beings (other organisms that have a nervous system and the capacity to feel pain) have the right to not feel pain. According to the national director of the People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA) “Animal liberationists do not separate out the human animal. A rat is a pig is a dog is a boy (when it comes to the degree of moral worth)” (Lutherer, Simon, 10). It is clear that the notion of pain and suffering has been brought up throughout the history of the animal rights movement.

An objection to the “feeling pain and suffering” notion might be that NHA just generally do not feel pain or that the pain and suffering they are feeling cannot be measured. I would argue against these points stating the fact that we cannot even tell whether or not another human is in pain or suffering with absolute certainty. Just because my friend might have a nail through his hand does not mean he is necessarily in pain. Just because my friend might be screaming at the top of his lungs for “help!” also does not mean he is necessarily in pain. My friend might be sedated or lying. So the notion of behavioral cues is certainly not absolute, but is relatively the best method of determining ones pain we have. We designate human yelling and dog yelping as indicators of being in pain. Also, in the case concerning the dogs in the experiment, a dog’s neural network is relatively similar to our own. A dog feels pain when burnt and yelps when it feels pain. To say that all NHA do not feel pain is just plain scientifically and physiologically wrong.

Now that we can see NHA deserve moral consideration, why should we help them?  Authors Pamela Carlisle-Frank and Tom Flanagan argue that we should prevent animal abuse and suffering for the following reasons. First, animal abuse is a precipitating factor when looking at case studied of people who suffer from personality disorders such as antisocial personality disorder. Second, animal abuse is correlated with violence directed toward humans. Third, animal abuse is correlated with violence towards one’s spouse, family, or children. Fourth, innocent animals are being stripped of their well-being (and inevitably their interests) (Carlisle-Frank, Flanagan, 19-20).

Paul Taylor, professor of philosophy at Brooklyn College, argues that we should help and respect NHA interests because we are in fact just as dependent on them as they are dependent on us. For example, trees depend on us for our carbon dioxide exhalation. Well, we also depend on trees for their oxygen release. Without trees, there would be no human life. In the crude game of survival, we are all on the same playing field. We are just as equally vulnerable to diseases and inevitably death as any other NHA (although we might be able to prolong it through medicine and things of that nature). I’m sure Singer and Regan would accept this notion.

The implications of the above arguments supporting the involvement of NHA in our moral consideration are relatively drastic. If one were to truly follow the above statements, one would have to refrain from eating meat, hunting, and wearing all types of animal hides. Since the process of obtaining these things involve the pain and suffering of NHA, they must be eliminated if we wish to stay morally consistent. Of course, this might be too big of a bite to swallow for some. Hunting and fishing are hobbies to many. Singer’s utilitarian view and Regan and Taylors’s respect for persons view would all stand side by side on this issue concerning NHA and their right to moral consideration. I personally agree with this notion despite all of the “inconvenient” changes needed to be made. The moral consideration and well-being of a NHA trumps my desire of me eating burgers from McDonalds or wearing fur coats.